

FPMT BASIC PROGRAM

Tenets

PRESENTATION OF TENETS

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Translated from the Tibetan

by

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PRESENTATION OF TENETS

by

Venerable Manjushri Chokyi Gyaltsen

Homage to all who are holy and venerable, existing inseparable in entity with Lama-Protector Manjushri

To explain the presentation of tenets, there are three points:

1. definition,
2. divisions and
3. the meaning of each division.

1. Definition

The definition of a proponent of Buddhist tenets is: a proponent of tenets who accepts the three jewels as authentic objects of refuge and does not assert any objects of refuge other than these.

2. Divisions

There are four divisions:

Proponents of

1. Vaibhasika (Great Exposition School or Particularists),
2. Sautrantika (Sutra School),
3. Cittamatra (Mind Only School) and
4. Madhyamaka (Middle Way School).

The first two are also known as the two schools that propound the meaning [that external objects are truly existent].

3. Meaning of each division

The explanation of the Vaibhasika system, Sautrantika system, Cittamatra system, and Madhyamaka system [Proponents of Non-entityness].

VAIBHASIKA (Great Exposition or Particularist School)

The first school is explained by way of seven points:

1. definition
2. divisions
3. etymology
4. mode of asserting objects
5. mode of asserting object-possessors
6. mode of asserting selflessness, and
7. presentation of grounds and paths.

1. Definition

The definition of a Vaibhasika is: one who propounds Hinayana tenets, and asserts external objects to be truly existent but does not assert self-cognizers.

2. Divisions

There are three divisions:

1. Kashmiris,
2. Aparantakas and
3. Magadhas.

3. Etymology

If someone asks why they are called Vaibhasikas, it is because they propound tenets following *The Great Detailed Explanation (Mahavibhasa)*, and also because they propound the three times as instances of substance.

4. Mode of asserting objects

The definition of a thing is: that which is able to perform a function. Thing, existent and object of knowledge are mutually inclusive.

There are two divisions of things:

1. permanent things and
2. impermanent things.

Non-compounded space, analytical cessations and non-analytical cessations are examples of permanent things.

Product, created object and impermanent are examples of impermanent things.

Another way of dividing things is into

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon which is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would cease. A vase and a woolen cloth are examples because if a vase is broken with a hammer, the mind apprehending it ceases, and if a woolen cloth is separated into its individual threads, the mind apprehending it ceases.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon which is such that, if it were broken or mentally separated into parts, the mind apprehending that object would not cease. Examples include directionally partless particles, temporally partless (moments of) consciousness and non-compounded (objects).

From the *Abhidharmakosha*: “A thing which, if broken or mentally separated into other (parts) is no longer understood by the mind such as a pot or water – is conventionally existent; (all) others are ultimately existent.”

Then, the three times are asserted as substance because (the Vaibhasikas) assert that a pot exists even at the time of the past of a pot, and a pot exists even at the time of the future of a pot, (and a pot exists in the present).

5. Mode of asserting object-possessors (subjects)

(Some) assert the mere collection of the five aggregates as the illustration of the person, (some) assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person, and so on.

There are two kinds of mind:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

There are two types of valid cognizers:

1. valid direct perceivers and
2. valid inferential cognizers.

There are three types of valid direct perceivers:

1. sense direct perceivers,
2. mental direct perceivers and
3. yogic direct perceivers.

Valid sense direct perceivers are not pervaded by consciousness because a visual sense power is (an instance of) a valid direct perceiver.

There are two types of yogic direct perceivers:

1. yogic direct perceivers that clearly realize selflessness of persons and
2. yogic direct perceivers that clearly realize subtle impermanence.

There are two types of the former:

1. yogic direct perceivers that realize the emptiness of a permanent, partless, independent person, and
2. yogic direct perceivers that realize the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person.

6. Mode of asserting selflessness

Subtle selflessness and subtle selflessness of persons are mutually inclusive.

Selflessness of phenomena is not asserted because the Vaibhasikas assert that established base is pervaded by self of phenomena.

Among them, the Vasiputriyans assert a selflessness of persons that is an emptiness of being permanent, partless and independent. However, they do not assert a selflessness of persons that is

an emptiness of being self-supporting or substantially existent because they assert a self-supporting, substantially existent self that is neither one entity with nor a different entity from the aggregates, neither permanent nor impermanent, but is inexpressible.

7. Presentation of grounds and paths

This is explained in two parts:

- a. objects of abandonment and
- b. actual presentation of grounds and paths.

a. Objects of abandonment

They assert two types of obscurations:

1. afflictive obscurations and
2. non-afflictive obscurations.

There is no designation for 'obscurations to omniscience.'

Afflictive obscurations act chiefly as obscurations to the attainment of liberation and non-afflictive obscurations act chiefly as obstacles to all-knowingness.

Examples of the first are a conception grasping a self-supporting or substantially existent person, the three poisons together with their seeds, and so forth that arise due to that conception.

Examples of the second are the latencies of the conception grasping a self-supporting or substantially existent person and the negative tendencies that arise due to these latencies.

b. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

Persons of the three vehicles have different ways of travelling the path.

Those of the hearer lineage combine the view realizing the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person with a small collection of merit and, after practising for three lifetimes or more, attain small enlightenment.

Those of the solitary realizer lineage combine the view realizing the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person with a middling collection of merit and, after practising for one hundred aeons or more, attain middling enlightenment.

Bodhisattvas combine the view realizing the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person with a great collection of merit and, after practising for at least three countless great aeons, attain great enlightenment.

There is also a difference in the way they collect the accumulation of merit.

Bodhisattvas, having collected merit for three countless great aeons on the great stage of the path of accumulation and below, attain (all paths from) the heat stage of the path of preparation through the path of no-more-learning on one seat.

Solitary realizers, having collected merit for one hundred great aeons on the great stage of the path of accumulation and below, attain [all paths from] the heat stage of the path of preparation through the path of no-more-learning on one seat.

Hearers collect merit on all four learning paths and [for some] it is necessary to train on the learning paths even up to fourteen lifetimes after attaining superior paths.

They assert that a buddha's form aggregate is not buddha because it is an object to be abandoned. This is because it is included in the same lifetime as the body of the previous bodhisattva on the path of preparation. There is a pervasion because the body of the bodhisattva on the path of preparation is the aggregate thrown by previous karma and affliction .

They do not accept a complete enjoyment body [sambhogakaya] and they assert that when the highest emanation body attains nirvana without remainder [of true suffering], the mental continuum ceases.

Although a buddha superior has abandoned all suffering and its origins without exception, it does not contradict that he still has true suffering in his continuum. This is because he has abandoned every single affliction that observes true suffering, therefore is considered to have abandoned true suffering.

Hearers and solitary realizer foe destroyers, from the attainment of the state of foe destroyer until they die (lit: give up their body), are foe destroyers with remainder. After death (lit: giving up their body), they are considered to have attained nirvana without remainder.

Although at the time of nirvana with remainder they abandon afflictive obscurations without exception, they do not abandon non-afflictive obscurations. Non- afflictive obscurations are not destroyed by opponent powers at the time of attaining nirvana without remainder but they are not existent because at that time their basis, the mental continuum, ceases.

Proponents of realism [i.e. true existence], when distinguishing definitive and interpretable sutras, do so by means of whether they are acceptable according to their words. [Some among] the two [schools] that propound the meaning do not accept the Mahayana collection to be Buddha's word because most Vaibhasikas assert that sutras are necessarily sutras of definitive meaning.

SAUTRANTIKA (Sutra School)

The second school is explained by way of definition, divisions, etymology, mode of asserting objects, mode of asserting object-possessors, mode of asserting selflessness, and presentation of grounds and paths.

1. Definition

The definition of a Sautrantika is: a person who propounds Hinayana tenets and accepts both self-cognizers and external objects.

Sautrantika and exemplifier are mutually inclusive.

2. Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Sautrantikas Following Scripture and
2. Sautrantikas Following Reasoning.

An example of the former is a Sautrantika who follows the *Abhidharmakosha*, and an example of the latter is a Sautrantika who follows the seven treatises on valid cognition.

3. Etymology

They are called Sautrantikas because they propound tenets following the sutras of the Buddha, and they are called exemplifiers because they like to explain all phenomena by means of examples.

4. Mode of asserting objects

The definition of an existent is: that which is observed by a valid cognizer.

There are two divisions of existents:

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: a phenomenon that is able to perform a function ultimately. Ultimate truth, truly established, [functioning] thing, product, impermanent phenomenon, compounded phenomenon, substance, and specifically characterized phenomenon are mutually inclusive.

The definition of a conventional truth is: a phenomenon that is not able to perform a function ultimately. Conventional truth, falsely established, permanent phenomenon, and generally characterized phenomenon are mutually inclusive.

Again, existents have two divisions:

1. negative phenomena and
2. affirmative phenomena.

The definition of a negative phenomenon is: an object realized by means of the mind apprehending it eliminating its object of negation.

The definition of an affirmative phenomenon is: an object realized by means of the mind apprehending it not eliminating its object of negation.

There are two types of negatives:

1. non-affirming negatives and
2. affirming negatives.

Illustrations of the first are: non-compounded space, true cessations, and emptiness.

Illustrations of the second are: opposite of not being a [functioning] thing and the appearance [of a pot] as opposite of not being a pot to a conception apprehending a pot .

Again, existents have two divisions:

1. single phenomena and
2. different phenomena.

Single phenomena can be divided into

1. false singles and
2. true singles.

Object of knowledge (in general) and generally characterized phenomena are examples of false singles.

Functioning thing and impermanent phenomenon are examples of true singles.

Different phenomena can be divided into

1. false differentials and
2. true differentials.

The two – a pot's isolate and a pillar's isolate – is an example of a false differential.

The two – a pot and a pillar – is an example of a true differential.

Past and future are both permanent. Present and thing are mutually inclusive.

5. Mode of asserting object-possessors

(Some) Sautrantikas assert the continuum of the aggregates as the illustration of the person, and (some) assert the mental consciousness as the illustration of the person.

The first is asserted by the Sautrantikas following the *Abhidharmakosha* and the second by the Sautrantikas following the *Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition*.

The definition of mind is: that which is clear and cognizing.

There are two types of mind:

- a. valid cognizers and
- b. non-valid cognizers.

a. Valid cognizers

The definition of a valid cognizer is: a new incontrovertible cognizer.

It is necessary to mention all three – 'new', 'incontrovertible' and 'cognizer' – as the borders in the definition of a valid cognizer because saying 'new' eliminates a subsequent cognizer as a valid

cognizer, saying 'incontrovertible' eliminates correct assumption as a valid cognizer, and saying 'cognizer' eliminates a physical (sense) power as a valid cognizer.

Valid cognizers can be divided into two:

1. valid direct perceivers and
2. valid inferential cognizers.

The definition of a direct perceiver is: a cognizer that is non-mistaken and free from conceptually.

The definition of a valid direct perceiver is: a new, incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptually.

There are four types of valid direct perceivers:

1. self-cognizing valid direct perceivers,
2. sensory valid direct perceivers,
3. mental valid direct perceivers and
4. yogic valid direct perceivers.

The definition of a self-cognizing valid direct perceiver is: a new, incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptually, bears the aspect of an apprehender and only looks inward.

The definition of a sensory valid direct perceiver is: a new, incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptually and that arises in dependence upon a physical sense power as its uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of a mental valid direct perceiver is: a new and incontrovertible cognizer that is free from conceptually and that arises in dependence upon a mental power as its uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of a yogic valid direct perceiver is: a wisdom consciousness that clearly realizes subtle impermanence, or coarse or subtle selflessness of persons, having depended upon a concentration that is the union of tranquil abiding and special insight as its uncommon empowering condition.

There are three types of yogic valid direct perceivers:

1. a valid cognizer that clearly realizes subtle impermanence,
2. a valid cognizer that clearly realizes coarse selflessness of persons and
3. a valid cognizer that clearly realizes subtle selflessness of persons.

The definition of a valid inferential cognizer is: a new and incontrovertible conceptual cognizer that arises in dependence upon a correct sign, its basis.

There are three divisions of valid inferential cognizers:

1. inferential cognizers by the power of the fact,
2. inferential cognizers through renown, and
2. inferential cognizers through belief.

An illustration of the first is an inferential cognizer that realizes sound to be impermanent by the sign, 'product.'

An illustration of the second is an inferential cognizer that realizes that ‘rabbit-bearer’ is suitable to be called by the term ‘moon’ by the sign, ‘existing among objects of conception.’

An illustration of the third is an inferential cognizer that realizes the scripture – ‘from giving (arises) wealth; from ethics (arises) happiness’ – is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it by the sign that it is a scripture certified by a three-fold investigation.

Inference through renown is necessarily an inference by the power of the fact.

Direct perceivers are not necessarily valid direct perceivers and inferential cognizers are not necessarily valid inferential cognizers because the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending form and the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound as impermanent are subsequent cognizers.

This is so because *The Correct* [Dharmottara’s *Commentary to (Dharmakirti’s) ‘Ascertainment of Valid Cognition’*] says: “The two—the first moments of direct perceivers and inferential cognizers—are valid cognizers. Later moments of those continua—because they are not different in establishment and abiding—have abandoned being valid cognizers.”

b. Non-valid cognizers

The definition of a non-valid cognizer is: a cognizer that is not new and incontrovertible.

There are five divisions:

1. subsequent cognizers,
2. wrong consciousnesses,
3. doubt,
4. correct assumption and
5. minds to which (the object) appears but is not ascertained (inattentive perception).

The definition of a subsequent cognizer is: a cognizer that realizes what has already been realized.

It has two divisions:

1. conceptual subsequent cognizers and
2. non-conceptual subsequent cognizers.

Examples of the first are a remembering consciousness remembering blue that is generated by being induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue, and the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound as impermanent.

An example of the second is the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending form.

The definition of a wrong consciousness is: a cognizer that engages (its object) incorrectly.

It has two divisions:

1. conceptual wrong consciousnesses and
2. non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses.

An example of the first is a conception apprehending that sound is permanent.

Examples of the second are a (visual) sense consciousness to which one moon appears as two moons, and a (visual) sense consciousness to which a snow mountain appears blue.

The definition of a doubt is: a mental factor that, by its own power, hesitates with regard to two alternatives.

A mental consciousness and an accompanying feeling that have the (five) concomitances with doubt are not that which, by its own power, wavers with regard to two alternatives because they waver with regard to two alternatives by the power of doubt.

There are three divisions of doubt:

1. doubt tending towards the factual,
2. doubt not tending towards the factual and
3. doubt that is equal to both sides.

An example of the first is a doubt that thinks 'maybe sound is impermanent.'

An example of the second is a doubt that thinks 'maybe sound is permanent.'

An example of the third is a doubt that thinks 'sound is either permanent or impermanent.'

The definition of a correct assumption is: a conceiving cognizer that accords with what is correct but is controvertible in conceiving its object.

It has five divisions:

1. correct assumption without a reason,
2. correct assumption with a contradictory reason,
3. correct assumption with an indefinite reason,
4. correct assumption with an inapplicable reason and
5. correct assumption with a correct but unestablished reason.

A mind apprehending sound as impermanent based on the mere words 'sound is impermanent' is an example of a correct assumption without a reason because 'sound is impermanent' is only a statement that sound is impermanent, but a perfect reason for sound being impermanent is not stated.

A mind apprehending sound as impermanent by the sign of its being empty of the ability to perform a function is an example of a correct assumption with a contradictory reason because being empty of the ability to perform a function is contradictory with sound.

A mind apprehending sound as impermanent by the sign of its being a measurable object is an example of a correct assumption with an indefinite reason because being a measurable object is an indefinite reason to establish sound as impermanent.

A mind apprehending sound as impermanent by the sign of its being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness is an example of a correct assumption with an inapplicable reason because being an object of apprehension of an eye consciousness is an inapplicable reason to establish sound as impermanent.

A mind apprehending sound as impermanent by the sign, 'product,' in the continuum of a person who has not ascertained with valid cognition that sound is impermanent is an example of a correct assumption with a correct but unestablished reason because, although 'product' is a correct sign to establish sound as impermanent, that correct sign has not been established by that person.

The definition of an inattentive perception is: a non-mistaken cognizer to which an object appears clearly but which does not ascertain its object.

It has three divisions:

1. sense direct perceivers,
2. mental direct perceivers and
3. self-cognizing direct perceivers that are (inattentive perceivers).

An example of the first is an audile consciousness apprehending sound at the time of being engrossed in beautiful visual forms.

Examples of the second are mental direct perceivers in the continuums of ordinary beings that apprehend the five objects – forms and so forth.

Examples of the third are self-cognizers in the continuums of ordinary beings that experience mental direct perceivers apprehending the five objects – forms and so forth.

In general, when object-possessors are divided, there are three:

1. beings,
2. speech and
3. valid cognizers .

When valid object-possessors (*tshad.ma*) are divided, there are three:

1. valid beings ,
2. valid speech and
3. valid consciousnesses.

An example of the first is The Teacher Buddha; an example of the second is the dharma wheel of the four truths; and examples of the third are a valid direct perceiver and a valid inferential cognizer.

6. Mode of asserting selflessness

They assert a coarse selflessness of persons that is the emptiness of a permanent, partless, independent person, and a subtle selflessness of persons that is the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person.

Like the Vaibhasikas, they do not assert a selflessness of phenomena.

7. Presentation of grounds and paths

When the three lineage-bearers collect merit, they do so on all four learning paths; it is for that reason that a buddha's form aggregate is asserted to be buddha.

Their presentation of obscurations, the mode of progressing on the grounds and paths, and so forth, are like (the assertions of) the Vaibhasikas.

CITTAMATRA (Mind Only School)

The Cittamatrin system is explained by way of seven divisions, as before.

1. Definition

The definition of a Cittamatrin is: a person who propounds Mahayana tenets, does not assert external objects, and asserts self-cognizers to be truly existent.

Cittamatrin, Vijnaptivadin (Proponent of Cognition) and Yogacarin (Practitioner of Yoga) are mutually inclusive.

2. Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. True Aspect Cittamatrins and
2. False Aspect Cittamatrins.

The definition of a True Aspect Cittamatrin is: a Cittamatrin who asserts that the factor of a form's appearance as a gross object to a form-apprehending direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary being [lit: a short-sighted being] **is not** polluted by the latencies of ignorance.

The definition of a False Aspect Cittamatrin is: a Cittamatrin who asserts that the factor of a form's appearance as a gross object to a form-apprehending direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary being [lit: a short-sighted being] **is** polluted by the latencies of ignorance.

There are three types of True Aspectarians:

1. proponents of an equal number of subjects and objects,
2. half-eggists and
3. non-pluralists.

Each has their own mode of asserting. It is said that:

Proponents of an equal number of subjects and objects are so-called because they assert that when an eye consciousness apprehending the mottle of colors on the wing of a butterfly apprehends the mottle of colors, from the object's side an aspect of each different color – blue, yellow, and so forth – is cast, and also from the subject's side aspects of each different color – blue, yellow, and so forth – are produced as true aspects.

The half-eggists are so-called because they assert that when (the mottle of colors) is apprehended, from the object's side an aspect of each different colour – blue, yellow, and so forth – is cast, and from the subject's side aspects of each different colour – blue, yellow, and so forth – are produced without aspects.

And the non-pluralists are so-called because they assert that when (the mottle of colors) is apprehended, from the object's side an aspect of each different colour – blue, yellow, and so forth – is not cast, but an aspect of the mere mottle is cast; from the subject's side aspects of each different colour – blue, yellow, and so forth – are not produced without aspects and an aspect of the mere mottle is produced without aspects.

There are two types of False Aspectarians:

1. Tainted False Aspectarians and
2. Untainted False Aspectarians.

3. Etymology

If someone asks why they are called ‘Cittamatrins’ – they are called ‘Mind Only’ because they assert that phenomena are merely in the nature of mind (sems), and they are called ‘Proponents of Cognition’ because they assert that all phenomena are merely in the nature of cognition (rnam.par.rig.pa) .

4. Mode of asserting objects

There are two divisions of object of knowledge:

1. ultimate truths and
2. conventional truths.

The definition of an ultimate truth is: that which is realized by a valid direct perceiver that directly realizes it by way of the vanishing of dualistic appearances.

Ultimate truth, reality, element of qualities and final mode of subsistence are mutually inclusive.

There are two divisions of ultimate truths:

1. subtle selflessness of phenomena and
2. subtle selflessness of persons.

If subtle selflessnesses of phenomena are divided according to bases of emptiness, there are twenty emptinesses. When those are condensed there are eighteen; when those are condensed there are sixteen; when those are condensed there are four emptinesses, and so on.

Examples of subtle selflessness of phenomena are: an emptiness that is a form and its form-apprehending valid cognizer’s emptiness of being other substances, and an emptiness that is a form’s emptiness of existing by way of its own characteristics as a base for assigning the term ‘form.’

An example of a subtle selflessness of persons is an emptiness that is a person’s emptiness of being self-supporting or substantially existent.

The definition of a conventional truth is: that which is realized by a valid direct perceiver that directly realizes it by way of being together with dualistic appearances.

There are two divisions of conventional truths:

1. other-powered phenomena and
2. conventional truths that are included in imaginaries.

The first is mutually inclusive with compounded phenomena and the second is mutually inclusive with non-compounded phenomena other than ultimate truths.

They assert that all functioning things are common bases of truly established and false, that all realities are common bases of truly established and true, and that all non-compounded phenomena other than emptinesses are common bases of falsely established and false.

Realities are necessarily non-affirming negatives, and illustrations of other non-affirming negatives are similar to (those presented by) the Sautrantikas.

The five [sense] objects – forms, and so forth – are produced based on the substantial entity of an inner consciousness in dependence upon the latencies of common and uncommon actions being placed on the mind-basis-of-all; they are not established as external objects.

According to the True Aspectarians, the five [sense] objects – forms, and so forth – are asserted to be established as gross [objects], although they are not external objects.

According to the False Aspectarians, the five [sense] objects – forms, and so forth – are not gross [objects], because if they were established as gross objects they would necessarily be established as external objects.

5. Mode of asserting object-possessors

The True Aspectarians assert eight collections of consciousness. They add a mind-basis-of-all and an afflicted mind to the six collections of consciousness asserted by other proponents of tenets, thereby asserting eight collections of consciousness.

There are illustrations of both mind-basis-of-all and afflicted mind: a consciousness that does not depend on a sense power as its empowering condition and is factually other than the collection of six consciousnesses [is an illustration of] the first, and a consciousness that observes its observed object – the mind-basis-of-all – and as its aspect apprehends it to be a self-supporting or substantially existent I [is an illustration of] the second.

They [True Aspectarians] assert mind-basis-of-all as the illustration of the person that [serves as] the support of actions and results.

The False Aspectarians assert six collections of consciousnesses and posit the mere mental consciousness as the illustration of the person that [serves as] the support of actions and results.

[The Cittamatrins] assert two types of mind:

1. valid and
2. non-valid.

They assert two types of valid cognizers:

1. valid direct perceivers and
2. valid inferential cognizers.

There are four types of direct perceivers. Self-cognizing direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily non-mistaken consciousnesses. Sense direct perceivers in ordinary beings' continuums are necessarily mistaken consciousnesses. There are two types of mental direct perceivers in ordinary beings' continuums: mistaken consciousnesses and non-mistaken consciousnesses.

Direct perceivers are not necessarily valid direct perceivers because, although there are form-apprehending mental direct perceivers in ordinary beings' continuums, there are no valid form-apprehending mental direct perceivers in ordinary beings' continuums.

An ordinary being's self-cognizer experiencing a form-apprehending mental direct perceiver and the second moment of a form-apprehending sense direct perceiver of an ordinary being are non-valid cognizers.

There are four types of yogic direct perceivers:

1. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize subtle impermanence,
2. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize subtle selflessness of persons,
3. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize coarse selflessness of persons and
4. yogic direct perceivers that directly realize selflessness of phenomena.

Valid inferential cognizers are necessarily conception. If it is an inferential cognizer with respect to a phenomenon, it is not necessarily a conception with respect to that phenomenon because, although an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent is an inferential cognizer with respect to sound's emptiness of permanence, it is not a conception with respect to that. This is because if it is a conception with respect to a phenomenon, it is pervaded by the aspect of that phenomenon appearing to it, and with regard to an inferential cognizer realizing sound as impermanent, the aspect of sound's emptiness of permanence does not appear. Therefore, that (inferential cognizer) does not realize (sound's emptiness of permanence) explicitly; it realizes that implicitly (when) it realizes impermanent sound explicitly.

6. Mode of asserting selflessness

Their mode of positing illustrations of coarse and subtle selflessness of persons is like (that of the systems of) Svatantrika-Madhyamika and below.

An illustration of a selflessness of phenomena is an emptiness that is a form and its form-apprehending valid cognizer's emptiness of being other substances.

7. Presentation of grounds and paths

This has two divisions:

- a. objects of abandonment and
- b. actual presentation of grounds and paths.

a. Objects of abandonment

Afflictive obscurations include self-grasping of persons together with its seeds, and the three poisons together with their seeds that arise due to the power of that [self-grasping].

Obscurations to omniscience include grasping-as-true together with its seeds, the latencies of that [conception], and all mistaken dualistic appearances that arise due to the power of that [grasping-as-true].

b. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

Holders of the hearer lineage combine the view realizing selflessness of persons with a small collection of merit for their own welfare, their object of intent and holders of the solitary realizer lineage combine the view realizing selflessness of persons with a middling collection of merit for their own welfare, their object of intent. In dependence on having familiarized for three lifetimes and so on [in the case of Hearers] and one hundred eons and so on [in the case of Solitary Realizers], each actualizes their respective enlightenment.

Bodhisattvas combine the view realizing the emptiness of subject and object being of other substances with a great collection of merit for the sake of others, their object of intent, and, in dependence on having familiarized for three countless great aeons and so on, actualize their enlightenment.

True Aspectarians assert that when hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers attain nirvana without remainder, their mental continuums are severed. They assert that it is impossible for a buddha superior's mental continuum to be severed because bodhisattvas first attain enlightenment in Akanishtha [Highest Pure Land] in a Complete Enjoyment Body, and that Complete Enjoyment Body, without a continuum of similar aspect being severed for as long as samsara is not empty, enacts the welfare of others, through various emanations, according to the fortunes of disciples.

[The True Aspectarians also] assert that the three vehicles are definite in their own lineages because sentient beings, from beginningless time, have three different lineages or dispositions. Due to this they have three different aspirations, due to which they have three different ways of accomplishing, and from that they attain three different results.

The False Aspectarians do not assert that when hearer and solitary realizer foe destroyers attain nirvana without remainder their mental continuums are severed. Although they assert that at that time only the continuum of the mere awareness that is included in true sufferings and true origins ceases, a mere awareness goes to the buddha ground; thus they assert the establishment of one final vehicle.

MADHYAMAKA (Middle Way School).

The system of the proponents of non-entityness is explained by way of

1. definition,
2. divisions, and
3. the meaning of each division.

1. Definition

The definition of a proponent of non-entityness is: a person who propounds Mahayana tenets and does not assert real, true [existence], even nominally.

2. Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Svatantrika and
2. Prasangika.

3. Meaning of each division

The explanation of the Svatantrika and Prasangika systems.

SVATANTRIKA-MADHYAMAKA (Autonomy Middle Way School)

This is explained according to seven points:

1. definition,
2. divisions,
3. etymology,
4. mode of asserting objects,
5. mode of asserting object-possessors,
6. mode of asserting selflessness, and
7. presentation of grounds and paths!.

1. Definition

The definition of a Svatantrika is: a Madhyamika who, by means of accepting autonomous reasons, does not accept true existence, even nominally.

A Svatantrika is mutually inclusive with a Madhyamika who propounds natural/inherent existence.

2. Divisions

There are two divisions:

1. Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika and
2. Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika.

The definition of a Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamika is: a Madhyamika who propounds a presentation of nominal existence mostly in accordance with Sautrantika tenets.

The definition of a Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika is: a Madhyamika who propounds a presentation of nominal existence mostly in accordance with Cittamatra tenets.

Some examples of Sautrantika-Svatantrika are Bhavaviveka and Jnanagarbha; examples of Yogacara-Svatantrika are Shantarakshita, Haribhadra, and Kamalashila.

3. Etymology

The reason why Bhavaviveka is said to be a Svatantrika-Madhyamika is that he is a Madhyamika who asserts reasons that exist from their own side.

4. Mode of asserting objects

Established by way of its own characteristics, established from its own side and inherent existence are mutually inclusive.

Non-compounded space, true cessations, past, future, and subtle selflessness of persons are non-affirming negatives and conventional truths.

Ultimate truth, reality, and subtle selflessness of phenomena are mutually inclusive.

The Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that the five sense objects – form, etc. – are of different entities from consciousness, and they are gross, external objects composed of partless particles.

The Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert that the five sense objects – form, etc., – are one entity with the consciousness apprehending them.

5. Mode of asserting object-possessors

They assert a collection of six consciousnesses, and that the mental consciousness is the illustration of the person.

There are two types of mind:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

The first [valid cognizers] are of two types:

1. valid direct perceivers and
2. valid inferential cognizers.

The Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas do not assert self-cognizing direct perceivers.

The Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas assert all four types of direct perceivers; self-cognizing direct perceivers and yogic direct perceivers are necessarily non-mistaken consciousnesses. The other two (types of direct perceivers) have (instances of) both mistaken and non-mistaken (consciousnesses).

Sautrantika, Cittamatra, and Svatantrika all assert that direct perceivers are necessarily non-conceptual consciousnesses; that a subsequent cognizer is necessarily a consciousness that is not a valid cognizer; that consciousnesses mistaken with respect to their determined objects are necessarily wrong consciousnesses; that if it is a mistaken consciousness with respect to a phenomenon, it is necessary a non-valid mind with respect to that phenomenon; that if it is an inferential cognizer it is necessarily a non-valid mind with respect to its appearing object; and so forth.

6. Mode of asserting selflessness

They assert that a person's emptiness of being permanent, partless, and independent is the coarse selflessness of persons, and a person's emptiness of being self-supporting or substantially existent is the subtle selflessness of persons.

According to the Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, the emptiness of a form and its form-apprehending valid cognizer being of other substances is the coarse selflessness of phenomena, and they assert that all phenomena's emptiness of true existence is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two [subtle] selflessnesses are differentiated by way of their objects of negation and not by way of their bases of emptiness. This is because the refutation of the object of negation – true existence, upon the base – person, is the subtle selflessness of phenomena, and the refutation of self-supporting, substantial existence upon the base – person, is the subtle selflessness of persons.

The two self-grasping are differentiated by way of the manner of grasping and not by way of their observed object. This is because observing the base – person, and grasping it as truly-existent is self-grasping of phenomena, and observing the base – person, and grasping it as self-supporting or substantially existent is self-grasping of persons.

7. Presentation of grounds and paths

The Yogacara-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas posit the differences between the persons of the three vehicles to be that they have three different obscurations as main objects to be abandoned and three different views as main objects of meditation.

Holders of the hearer lineage, having taken the conception grasping a self-supporting or substantially existent person together with its retinue as their main objects of abandonment, and having taken, as the antidote to that, the view realizing the emptiness of a self-supporting or substantially existent person as their main object of meditation, attain small enlightenment.

Holders of the solitary realizer lineage, having taken the conception grasping that a form and the valid cognizer grasping that form to be of other substances as their main object of abandonment, and having taken, as the antidote to that, the view realizing the emptiness of apprehender-subjects and apprehended-objects being of other substances as their main object of meditation, attain middling enlightenment.

Bodhisattvas, having taken [the conception] grasping true existence together with its latencies as their main objects of abandonment, and having taken, as the antidote to that, the view realizing that all phenomena are without true existence as their main object of meditation, attain great enlightenment.

According to the Sautrantika-Svatantrika-Madhyamikas, there is no difference between hearers and solitary realizers regarding their main objects of abandonment and main objects of meditation, because both are alike in taking afflictive obscurations as their main objects of abandonment, and also in taking selflessness of persons as their main object of meditation.

However, there is a reason why the two have different results, inferior and superior. It is because there are differences due to the size of their collections of merit, and the length of time [they spend accumulating merit].

[The Svatantrikas] are similar to the Cittamatrins in asserting two kinds of sutras—Mahayana and Hinayana—and two parts of [sutras]—definitive and interpretable. However, the illustrations are different because the Cittamatrins assert the first two wheels as sutras of interpretable meaning and the last wheel as sutras of definitive meaning.

In this context [of the Svatantrika school], the first and last wheels are sutras of interpretable meaning and the middle wheel has two parts: interpretable and definitive. They assert that those [sutras of the middle wheel] in which the qualification 'ultimately' is affixed to the object of negation are of definitive meaning, and those [sutras] of the middle wheel in which [the qualification 'ultimately'] is not affixed are sutras of interpretable meaning.

PRASANGIKA-MADHYAMAKA (Consequence Middle Way School)

The Prasangika system is explained according to seven divisions, as before.

1. Definition

The definition of a Prasangika is: a Madhyamika who, by means of asserting merely other-approved consequences, does not accept true existence, even nominally.

2. Examples

Buddhapalita, Chandrakirti and Shantideva are examples (of Prasangika-Madhyamikas).

3. Etymology

There is a reason why Acharya Buddhapalita is called a Prasangika. It is because he asserts that an inference realizing a thesis is generated in the continuum of an opponent merely [by stating] a consequence.

4. Mode of asserting objects

There are two kinds of objects:

1. hidden and
2. manifest.

[Prasangikas] assert that objects that must be realized by depending on a sign are hidden, and objects that can be ascertained by ordinary beings through the strength of experience, without depending on a sign, are manifest.

Illustrations of the first are the impermanence of sound and sound's emptiness of true existence. Illustrations of the second are a pot and a woolen cloth.

Directly perceivable [object] and manifest [object] are mutually inclusive.

Another way of dividing objects is into

1. conventional truths and
2. ultimate truths.

The definition of something's being a conventional truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing a conventionality.

It is not appropriate to divide [conventional truths] into two: real conventionalities and unreal conventionalities, because there are no real conventionalities. This is because if it is a conventionality, it is necessarily not real. This is because if it is a conventionality, it is necessarily unreal.

It is appropriate to divide conventional truths into two: real and unreal relative to the perspective of worldly consciousness because a form is real with relative to the perspective of worldly consciousness and the reflection of a face in a mirror is unreal relative to the perspective of worldly consciousness. If it is real relative to the perspective of worldly consciousness it is not necessarily existent because truly existent forms are [real relative to the perspective of worldly consciousness but do not exist].

The definition of something's being an ultimate truth is: an object found by a valid cognizer distinguishing an ultimate and with respect to which a valid cognizer distinguishing an ultimate becomes a valid cognizer distinguishing an ultimate.

The divisions [of ultimate truths] are like those in the context of Cittamatra [subtle selflessness of persons and subtle selflessness of phenomena], but in this context it is asserted that true cessations are necessarily ultimate truths.

5. Mode of asserting object-possessors

They assert the mere 'I' imputed in dependence on the five aggregates as the illustration of the person, and person is necessarily a non-associated compositional factor.

There are two kinds of mind:

1. valid cognizers and
2. non-valid cognizers.

There are two kinds of valid cognizers:

1. valid direct perceivers and
2. valid inferential cognizers.

They do not assert self-cognizing direct perceivers. Sense consciousnesses in sentient beings' continuums are necessarily mistaken consciousnesses. Mental consciousnesses and yogic direct perceivers can be [either] mistaken or non-mistaken.

There are two kinds of valid direct perceivers:

1. conceptual valid direct perceivers and
2. non-conceptual valid direct perceivers.

Illustrations of the first are the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound as impermanent, and a remembering consciousness factually remembering blue that is produced through being induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue. An illustrations of the second is a sense direct perceiver apprehending form.

Valid direct perceivers are not necessarily directly perceivable [objects] because a yogic direct perceiver is necessarily not a directly perceivable [object]. This is because directly perceivable [objects] are mutually inclusive with manifest phenomena.

Subsequent cognizers are necessarily valid direct perceivers.

When inferential cognizers are divided, there are four: :

1. inference by the power of the fact,
2. inference through renown,
3. inference through analogy , and
4. inference through belief.

Inference through renown and inference through analogy are included in inference by the power of the fact.

If it is a valid cognizer, it is not necessarily non-mistaken with respect to its determined object because an inferential cognizer realizing sound as impermanent is a mistaken consciousness with respect to sound as impermanent.

If it is a consciousness it necessarily realizes its object of comprehension because the mental image of a rabbit's horns is the object of comprehension of a conception apprehending the horns of a rabbit, and the mental image of sound as permanent is the object of comprehension of a conception apprehending sound as permanent.

6. Mode of asserting selflessness

They assert a coarse selflessness of persons that is a person's emptiness of being self-supporting or substantially existent, and a subtle selflessness of persons that is a person's emptiness of true existence.

They posit a coarse selflessness of phenomena that is the emptiness of a coarse object composed of partless particles and the valid cognizer apprehending it being of different substances, and a subtle selflessness of phenomena that is the emptiness of true existence of the aggregates, [a person's] basis of imputation.

The two [subtle] selflessnesses are differentiated according to their bases of emptiness and not according to their objects of negation. The refutation of the object of negation – true existence – upon the base, person, is the subtle selflessness of persons, and the refutation of the object of negation – true existence – upon the base, the aggregates, and so forth – is the subtle selflessness of phenomena.

The two [subtle] self-graspings are differentiated according to their observed object and not according to their mode of grasping because observing the base – person, and grasping it as truly existent is the [subtle] self-grasping of persons, and observing [a person's] basis of imputation – the aggregates, and so forth – and grasping them as truly existent, is the subtle self-grasping of phenomena.

7. Presentation of grounds and paths

This has two divisions: objects of abandonment and actual presentation of grounds and paths.

a. Objects of abandonment

They posit as afflictive obscurations the coarse and subtle self-graspings together with their seeds, as well as attachment and so forth together with their seeds that arise due to the power of [self-grasping]. These are obscurations that mainly interfere with the attainment of liberation.

They posit as obscurations to omniscience the latencies of grasping at true existence, and all factors of mistaken dualistic appearance that arise due to their power. These are obscurations that mainly interfere with the attainment of an exalted knower of all.

b. Actual presentation of grounds and paths

There is no difference in terms of superiority among the views that are the objects of meditation of persons of the three vehicles because all three are alike in taking as their main objects of meditation subtle selflessness of persons and subtle selflessness of phenomena.

There are differences with regard to their main objects of abandonment because hearers and solitary realizers take as their main objects of abandonment the two self-graspings together with their seeds, and bodhisattvas take as their main objects of abandonment the latencies of (self-grasping).

Nirvana without remainder is a suchness distinguished by the abandonment of the two self-graspings and their seeds in the continuums of hearer and solitary realizer foe-destroyers in meditative equipoise, and nirvana with remainder is the same kind of suchness in the continuums of hearer and solitary realizer foe-destroyers in the post-meditation state.

Holders of the Mahayana lineage who are definite in the lineage from the very first abandon afflictive obscurations and attain the eighth ground simultaneously, and they abandon obscurations to omniscience and attain the four bodies simultaneously.

Colophon

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